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JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2-2 and § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court err in refusing to set aside the default judgment where 
Arbogast failed to notify River Crossings of the initiation of default proceedings against 
it? This issue presents a question of law, which the Court reviews for correctness, 
according no deference to the district court. Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75 ffl| 8, 12, 11 
P.3d277. 
2. Did the district court abuse its limited discretion in refusing to set aside the 
default judgment where River Crossings' Rule 60(b) motion demonstrated reasonable 
justification for failing to respond, was timely, and presented meritorious defenses? This 
issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion; however, that "discretion is not unlimited." 
Lund v.Brown, 2000 UT 75 ^ 8-11, 11 P.3d 277. 
3. Did the district court abuse its limited discretion in refusing to set aside the 
default judgment based on faulty findings of fact? This Court will reverse findings of 
fact that the marshaled evidence demonstrates are clearly erroneous. Bingham 
Consolidation Co. v. Groesbeck, 2004 UT App 434, U 14, 105 P.3d 365, 370. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
See Addendum 
611 :367470v3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
This is an appeal from the district court's improper refusal to set aside the default 
judgment entered against River Crossings, despite the fact that River Crossings was given 
no notice of the default proceedings and despite the fact that River Crossings presented 
reasonable excuses for its failure to answer Arbogast's complaint. While actively 
engaged in settlement negotiations, Arbogast quietly obtained a default judgment against 
River Crossings after having admittedly promised River Crossings that it would not do so 
without prior notice to River Crossings. Relying on these representations, River 
Crossings held off on filing a responsive pleading while continuing to attempt settlement. 
The district court abused its limited discretion in refusing to accept River Crossings 
reasonable excuses as grounds for setting aside the default judgment. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
On January 10, 2006, Arbogast filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (Civil 
No. 06050096) in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County, State of Utah. 
(R. at 1.) Since the filing of the underlying Complaint, regarding the above-identified 
disputes, counsel for Arbogast was in contact with River Crossings' Nevada counsel, the 
law firm of Black Lobello & Sparks. (R. at 58.) 
During the ongoing settlement negotiations process, Arbogast granted River 
Crossings several extensions for its responsive pleading. (R. at 88-89.) On or around 
June 16, 2006, Mr. Utley, counsel for Arbogast, expressly stated to River Crossings' 
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Nevada counsel that he would not file for Default Judgment without first notifying them 
of Arbogast's intent to do so. (R. at 595 96.) 
On or around July 31, 2006, Arbogast presented the district court with a Default 
Certificate, without serving a copy on River Crossings. (R. at 32.) On August 11, 2006, 
Arbogast filed a Default Judgment against River Crossings, without serving a copy on 
River Crossings. (R. at 35.) Contrary to his assurances made on June 16, 2006, Mr. 
Utley did not notify River Crossings' counsel before filing the Default Certificate or the 
Default Judgment. (R. at 59.) River Crossings was first notified of the underlying 
Default Judgment when River Crossings' Nevada counsel received a copy of the Notice 
of Entry of Default Judgment on August 17, 2006. (R. at 59.) 
On September 26, 2006, River Crossings filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment 
and Orders. (R. at 45.) A hearing was held before the Honorable Eric A. Ludlow on 
February 21, 2007. (R. at 185.) The district court issued its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Relief on April 18, 
2007. (R. at 115.) 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
1. On or around September 16, 2004, Arbogast provided River Crossings with 
a loan in the amount of Two Million Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($2,450,000.00) (hereinafter "Loan"). (R. at 116 H 1.) 
2. The Loan was secured by a Trust Deed Note dated September 16, 2004. 
(R. at 1161f2.) 
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3. The signed Trust Deed Note provided the following schedule of payments: 
On October 165 2004, the, sum of $18,375.00 was due. Thereafter, the like sum was due 
on the 16th day of each month until the 16th of September, 2005, when the remaining 
unpaid balance, together with accrued interest, was due and payable. (R. at 116 Tf 4.) 
4. The subject Trust Deed Note also included the following terms regarding a 
penalty for late payments (hereinafter "Late Payment Penalty"): "A late payment penalty 
of Six percent (6.0%) of any payment due shall be assessed against the Maker if said 
payment has not been received by Holder within five (5) days of the due date." (R. at 
11718.) 
5. There is a dispute as to whether, sometime before September 16, 2005, 
Arbogast granted River Crossings an extension for the due date of the final payment. (R. 
at 58, 116 H 9.) River Crossings alleges that the final payment for the Trust Deed Note 
was in fact timely, as Arbogast had granted an extension to River Crossings. (R. at 58.) 
Arbogast alleges that it did not grant an extension. 
6. On October 7, 2005, twenty-one (21) days after September 16, 2005, River 
Crossings made the final payment. (R. at 116 U 7.) 
7. Thereafter, Arbogast asserted a Late Payment Penalty against River 
Crossings in the amount of One Hundred Forty Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-
Six Dollars ($148,176.00) plus accruing interest thereon at the rate of Twelve percent 
(12%) per annum from the date of October 7, 2005 to the present. (R. at 3, 117 ^ 10.) 
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8. Since October 7, 2005, there has been a dispute between Arbogast and 
River Crossings regarding, without limitation, the due date of the final payment and the 
enforceability and interpretation of the Late Payment Penalty. (R. at 58, 117 |^ 12.) 
9. Since the inception of the above-identified disputes, the parties have 
participated in several settlement negotiations. (R. at 58.) 
10. On or around October 26, 2005, Arbogast retained Attorney Chad Utley to 
represent it for the above identified disputes. (R. at 58.) 
11. On or around January 10, 2006, Arbogast filed a Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment (Civil No. 06050096) in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County, 
State of Utah. (R. at 1.) 
12. On or about December 20, 2005, Mr. Utley received a letter from the 
Nevada firm of Black Lobello & Sparks ("BLS"), informing him that River Crossings 
had retained its legal services. (R. at 118 f^ 13.) 
13. From the filing of the underlying Complaint, Mr. Utley was in contact with 
counsel at BLS. (R. at 58.) 
14. Mr. Utley granted BLS attorney, Aileen E. Cohen, at least two extensions 
of time in which to respond to the Complaint, to make a settlement offer and/or to seek 
Utah counsel. (R. at 88-89.) Until the discharge of her employment at BLS, which 
occurred on or around June 30, 2006, Ms. Cohen was in charge of the communications 
and settlement negotiations with Arbogast's counsel. (R. at 59 ]fl| 14-15.) 
15. The second extension given to Ms. Cohen expired on or about June 14, 
2006. (R. at 89, 118 U 16.) 
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16. Sometime between June 14, 2006 and June 29. 2006, Mr. Utley had contact 
with BLS attorneys, Tisha Black-Chernine and Josh Corelli. (R. at 119 f 18.) 
17. On or around June 16, 2006, Mr. Utley expressly stated to Ms. Black -
Chernine and Mr. Corelli that he would not pursue default judgment against River 
Crossings without first notifying them of Arbogast's intent to file for default. (R. at 59, 
96.) Mr. Utley has not disputed that he made this representation. 
18. On or about June 28, 2006, Mr. Corelli communicated a settlement offer to 
Mr. Utley via telephone on behalf of River Crossings. (R. at 119 ^ 19.) 
19. On or about June 29, 2006, Mr. Utley sent a letter to Ms. Black-Chernine 
and Mr. Corelli, rejecting River Crossings' June 28 settlement offer ("June 29 Letter"). 
(R.at91, 119^20.) 
20. The June 29 Letter also stated as follows: "My client has previously granted 
your client an extension of time within which to answer the complaint. However, given 
the present state of the case, I am, on behalf of my client, hereby requesting that your 
client file an Answer to the complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter." 
(R.at91.) 
21. At the time of the June 29 Letter, Ms. Black-Chernine was on extended 
vacation and was not made aware of the June 29 Letter. (R. at 96.) 
22. On June 30, Ms. Cohen, the BLS attorney who had been responsible for the 
communications and settlement negotiations with Arbogast's counsel, was discharged. 
Ms. Cohen's discharge caused matters regarding the subject matter to not be immediately 
addressed. (R. at 59 fflj 14-15.) 
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23. Interpreting Mr. Utley's June 29 Letter within the context of his prior oral 
representations and ongoing settlement negotiations, BLS understood that Mr. Utley was 
merely requesting that River Crossings file its answer within twenty days but would not 
pursue default judgment without first notifying BLS. (R. at 96-97.) 
24. Counsel for the parties had no discussions with one another between June 
29 and August 18, 2006. (R. at 7 H 23.) 
25. River Crossings' counsel further understood that Utah law, like Nevada 
law, required Arbogast to serve them with any default papers filed with the court. (R. at 
53-54.) 
26. However, on or around July 25, 2006, Mike Chernine, Managing Member 
of River Crossings, sent an email to Arbogast, requesting another settlement negotiation 
conference to discuss the above-identified dispute. (R. at 59, 102.) Arbogast does not 
dispute this. 
27. Arbogast never responded to River Crossings request for a settlement 
conference. (R. at 97.) 
28. Instead, just six days later, Arbogast presented the district court with a 
Certificate of Default, in which it falsely represented to the court that River Crossings 
had not appeared in the case. (R. at 32.) 
29. On August 11, 2006, Arbogast requested Default Judgment against River 
Crossings. (R. at 35.) 
30. On August 17, 2006, Notice of Entry of Default Judgment was filed with 
the Court and was sent by Arbogast to River Crossings. (R. at 37.) 
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31. River Crossings was first notified of the underlying Default Judgment when 
River Crossings' Nevada counsel received a copy of the Notice of Entry of Default 
Judgment on August 17, 2006. (R. at 59.) 
32. It was the understanding of River Crossings' Nevada counsel that the 
parties were continuing settlement negotiations between June 16, 2006 and August 11, 
2006. (R. at 59.) 
33. Contrary to his assurances made on June 16, 2006, and contrary to Utah 
law, Mr. Utley did not notify River Crossings' counsel of his intent to request a default 
against River Crossings. (R. at 59.) 
34. River Crossings' counsel's notification and communications with 
Arbogast's counsel constitute an appearance. (R. at 120.) 
35. Nevertheless, Arbogast did not serve River Crossings with a copy of the 
Certificate of Default or the request for entry of Default Judgment, as required by URCP 
Rule 5(a)(2). (R. at 35, 37.) 
36. On September 26, 2006, River Crossings filed a Motion for Relief from 
Judgment and Orders. (R. at 45.) 
37. The district court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order Denying Defendant's Motion on April 18, 2007. (R. at 115.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
River Crossings is entitled to reversal of the district court's refusal to set aside the 
default judgment improperly entered against it. Because Arbogast never served River 
Crossings with the default documents it filed with the district court—and because River 
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Crossings had no notice whatsoever of the initiation of default proceedings by 
Arbogast—the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter default against River Crossings. 
Furthermore, given Arbogast's failure to serve River Crossings with the default 
documents, and River Crossings justifiable reliance on Arbogast's representations that it 
would not seek a default without first notifying River Crossings, the district court abused 
its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
The district court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in refusing to 
set aside the default judgment against River Crossings pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part as follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in 
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; . . . (4) the judgment is void; . . . or (6) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis added). Because River Crossings mistakenly believed 
that Arbogast would not seek to obtain a default judgment against it without notice, and 
because Arbogast provided no notice of the default judgment proceedings, the district 
court should have set aside the default judgment under Rule 60(b) 
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I. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS VOID FOR LACK OF NOTICE TO 
RIVER CROSSINGS. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The district court erred as a matter of law in refusing to set aside the default 
judgment entered against River Crossings because River Crossings had no notice of the 
initiation of default proceedings against it and had no opportunity to respond. 
We ordinarily explain [the fact that a default judgment is void 
if the defendant received no notice of the time for answering] 
by stating that because the defendant failed to receive proper 
notice the court did not have jurisdiction. It is more accurate 
to say that because of the lack of the notice to the defendant 
the court did not have jurisdiction to enter a default judgment. 
Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879, 881 n.2 (Utah 1981) (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
When a motion to vacate a judgment is based on a claim of 
lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if 
jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without 
denying due process to the one against whom it runs. 
State v. Vijil 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). Because River 
Crossings had no notice of the initiation of default proceedings against it, the default 
judgment is void and the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter default judgment 
against River Crossings. 
B. River Crossings Was Entitled to Notice of the Default Proceedings. 
Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "expresses the general principle 
that notice of all proceedings must be provided to all parties." Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 
75 H 22, 11 P.3d 277 (emphasis added). 
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Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise 
directed by the court, . . . every written motion other than one 
heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, 
offer of judgment, and similar paper shall be served upon 
each of the parties. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1). 
Although subsection 5(a)(2) excepts "parties in default" from the general notice 
rule, River Crossings was not in default when Arbogast filed its Certificate of Default 
with the district court. A simple failure to file a responsive pleading does not 
automatically place a party in default. A party is not in default until the clerk of the court 
has signed the default certificate. Utah R. Civ. P. 55. Because River Crossings was not 
in default at the time Arbogast submitted the Certificate of Default with the court for 
signing, Arbogast was required to provide—and River Crossings was entitled to 
receive—notice of Arbogast's filing of the Certificate of Default with the court pursuant 
to Rule 5(a). 
Even if River Crossings could have been considered in default prior to the signing 
of the Certificate of Default by the court, it was nevertheless entitled to service of both 
the Certificate of Default and the request for entry of Default Judgment pursuant to Rule 
5(a)(2)(B). That rule provides that "a party in default for any reason other than for failure 
to appear shall be served with all pleadings and papers." Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2)(B) 
(emphasis added.) In its Findings of Fact, the district court expressly held that although 
River Crossing's counsel had not formally appeared, "Defendant's counsel's notification 
and communications with Plaintiffs counsel constitute an appearance." (R. at 120 ^ 29.) 
(emphasis added). River Crossings was therefore entitled to service of all pleadings and 
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papers in the case, including notice of Arbogast's filing of the Certificate of Default and 
the request for Default Judgment. 
This conclusion is mandated by Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, a Utah Supreme 
Court decision that is highly pertinent to this case. The defendants in Lund failed to file 
an answer to a counterclaim based on their mistaken belief that the proceedings had been 
stayed. Without providing notice to the defendants, opposing counsel sought a default 
judgment against them—as happened in this case. IdL ^ [j 5. The trial court entered defaults 
against the defendants and then entered default judgment against them. As in the present 
case, the only notice of the default proceedings given by opposing counsel was a copy of 
the entry of default judgment. Id. 
The Lund defendants then filed a motion to set aside the default judgment under 
Rule 60(b) on the grounds that they received no notice of the default proceedings and 
were mistaken as to the need to file a responsive pleading. Id^ |^ 14. The district court 
denied the motion. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that the defendants were 
entitled to notice of the default proceedings under Rule 5(a) and that the failure of 
opposing counsel to provide notice mandated reversal of the district court and setting 
aside the default judgment. Id. at ^ 20. 
River Crossings is likewise entitled to reversal of the district court's ruling on its 
motion to set aside the default judgment. As with the defendants in Lund, River 
Crossings received no notice from Arbogast of the initiation of default proceedings 
against it, was not served with the default requests, and had no opportunity to respond to 
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the default proceedings. River Crossings first learned of the default judgment when 
Arbogast served it with a notice of entry of default judgment.1 
Although the district court tacitly acknowledged in its Findings and Conclusions 
that River Crossings was entitled to notice of the default proceedings, it wrongly 
concluded that Mr. Utley's June 29 Letter to counsel for River Crossings constituted 
sufficient notice. (R. at 120 ^ 29.) In reality, that letter made no mention whatsoever of 
Arbogast's intention to seek default if River Crossings' failed to answer within the time 
requested. Neither did the letter satisfy the demands of Rule 5(a)(2) that Arbogast serve 
River Crossings with a copy of the Certificate of Default submitted to the district court 
for signature and the request for entry of default. (R. at 91.) 
As is plain on its face, the June 29 Letter merely constituted a "request" to River 
Crossings to file a responsive pleading within the timeframe provided. IdL At best, the 
letter simply set a deadline for River Crossings to file a responsive pleading—and in that 
regard was effectively akin to Rule 12(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
requires a defendant to file a responsive pleading to a complaint within 20 days. The 
June 29 Letter is no more notice of default than is Rule 12(a). If mere notice of a 
deadline to respond also necessarily constitutes notice of default proceedings in 
satisfaction of Rule 5(a)(2), then notice of default would be automatically imputed to 
1
 By failing to serve or otherwise notify River Crossings of the initiation of default 
proceedings against it Mr. Utley also violated the Utah Standards of Professionalism and 
Civility, Rule 14-301(16), Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice, which 
states: "Lawyers shall not cause the entry of a default without first notifying other 
counsel whose identity is known, unless their clients' legitimate rights could be adversely 
affected." (emphasis added). 
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every defendant who failed to file an answer within the time set forth in Rule 12(a). Such 
an interpretation would render Rule 5(a)(2) absolutely meaningless and superfluous. 
This Court cannot adopt such a reading, first, because it cannot be harmonized 
with the Supreme Court's decision in Lund and, second, because of the "well-established 
principle of statutory construction requiring [the Court] to give meaning, where possible 
to all provisions of a statute." Lund at ^ 23 (internal citations omitted). "Any 
interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous is to be 
avoided." Id. (internal citations omitted). Rule 5(a)(2) requires on its face that defaulting 
parties receive specific notice of the initiation of default proceedings through service of 
default filings, not merely notice of deadlines for filing responsive pleadings to a 
complaint. 
Because Arbogast failed to serve or otherwise notify River Crossings of the 
initiation of default proceedings against it, the resulting default judgment is void. The 
district court therefore lacked jurisdiction to enter default judgment against River 
Crossings, and the judgment cannot stand. The district court erred as a matter of law in 
refusing to set aside the default judgment under Rule 60(b). 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
SET AISDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WHERE RIVER CROSSINGS 
PRESENTED A "REASONABLE EXCUSE" FOR FAILING TO FILE A 
RESPONSIVE PLEADING. 
A. Standard of Review. 
Although the decision to set aside a default judgment is within the discretion of the 
district court, uthe court's discretion is not unlimited." Lund at U 10. The "nature of a 
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default judgment and the equitable nature of rule 60" provide meaningful limits on the 
district court's discretion. Id.. 
While a district judge has discretion to grant or deny a 60(b) 
motion to vacate a default judgment, that discretion is limited 
by three important considerations. First, Rule 60(b) is 
remedial in nature and therefore must be liberally applied 
Second, default judgments are generally disfavored; 
whenever it is reasonably possible, cases should be decided 
on their merits. Third, and as a consequence of the first two 
considerations, "where timely relief is sought from a default 
judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if 
any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the 
judgment so that cases may be decided on their merits." 
Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1974) (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis added) (cited by the Court in Lund at ^ 10). 
Because of these strong equitable considerations, Utah case law is replete with 
entreaties to lower courts to exercise their discretion liberally in granting relief from 
default judgments. 
[Discretion should be exercised in furtherance of justice and 
should incline towards granting relief in a doubtful case to the 
end that the party may have a hearing. 
Lund at H 10 (citing Helgesen v. Inyangimia, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981)) 
(emphasis added). 
[T]he court is anxious to protect the losing party who has not 
had the opportunity to present his claim or defense. 
Discretion must be exercised in furtherance of justice and the 
court will incline toward granting relief in a doubtful case to 
the end that the party may have a hearing. 
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 420, 260 P.2d 741, 743 (1953) (emphasis 
added). 
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It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch and 
to move calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to 
date. But it is even more important to keep in mind that the 
very reason for the existence of courts is to afford disputants 
an opportunity to be heard and to do justice between them. In 
conformity with that principle the courts generally tend to 
favor granting relief from default judgments where there is 
any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial 
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party. 
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 
(Utah 1975) (emphasis added). 
Given these vital policy interests, "it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of 
discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or 
excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is made to set it 
aside." Lund, at ^ 11 (quoting Helgesen, 636 P.2d at 1081; May hew v. Standard 
Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 54, 376 P.2d 951, 952 (1962)) (emphasis added). To that 
end, the Lund court pointedly noted that "while we review the trial court's decision in the 
instant case for abuse of discretion, we emphasize that the court's discretion is not 
unlimited." Lund at j^ 11 (emphasis added). 
B. River Crossings Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment Met All of 
the Requirements of Rule 60(b). 
River Crossings' motion demonstrated more than reasonable justification for its 
failure to file a responsive pleading in this case, was timely filed, and presented 
meritorious defenses. The district court therefore abused its discretion in refusing to set 
aside the default judgment entered against River Crossings. 
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i. Reasonable Justification or Excuse. 
In Lund, the Utah Supreme Court held that a "good faith, legitimate belief that no 
action would or could be taken . . . constitutes a 'reasonable justification or excuse' for 
the failure to reply." Lund at ^ 19. Under Rule 60(b), movants need not "show that their 
interpretation of [the] law is legally correct, but merely that they possessed a reasonable 
good faith belief in their interpretation. Id. at ^ 16. 
Such was precisely the case at hand. Based on Mr. Utley's express representations 
that he would not initiate default proceedings against River Crossings without first 
notifying opposing counsel, River Crossings reasonably and justifiably believed that no 
action would be taken against it without such notice. (R. at 96-97.) Furthermore, as set 
forth in detail above, had Arbogast complied with the requirements of URCP Rule 5(a), 
no such action could have been taken against River Crossings without notice. As also set 
forth above, Mr. Utley's June 29 Letter did not communicate notice of his intent to file 
for default against River Crossings and did not satisfy the demands of Rule 5(a). 
Compounding River Crossings' reasonable, good faith belief that no adverse 
action could or would be taken against it was a multiplicity of factors, which collectively 
resulted in River Crossings' failure to file a response. The attorney for River Crossings 
who had been responsible for negotiating and communication with opposing counsel was 
discharged, and the attorney who assumed those responsibilities went on an extended 
vacation—all at the very moment that Mr. Utley sent his June 29 letter. (R. at 59, 96.) 
Furthermore, throughout this timeframe, River Crossings' attorneys believed that 
settlement negotiations were ongoing. (R. at 59.) Just six days before Mr. Utley drafted 
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his June 29 Letter, River Crossings sent an email to Arbogast, requesting another 
settlement conference. (R. at 59, 102.) The district court entirely omitted this fact from 
its Findings. 
These circumstances combined to create a "perfect storm" of sorts, leading to the 
unfortunate series of events that culminated in an unwarranted default judgment against 
River Crossings. This is precisely the type of good faith, reasonable justification that the 
Lund court concluded fell well within the reach of Rule 60(b). 
ii. Timely. 
River Crossings' motion to set aside the default judgment was timely filed. There 
is no dispute as to this point. 
iii. Meritorious Defenses. 
River Crossings' motion to set aside the default judgment presented meritorious 
defenses. River Crossings need not actually prove its proposed defenses at this stage but 
merely show a meritorious defense so as to prevent the necessity of judicial review of 
questions which, on the face of the pleadings, are frivolous. Lund at ^ 28. River 
Crossings has plainly done so. River Crossings alleged in its motion that its payment 
was not late because Arbogast had granted River Crossings an extension of time to make 
the final payment and that Arbogast waived any Late Payment Penalty by agreeing to an 
extension for the final payment. (R. at 56.) River Crossings also alleged that the Late 
Payment Penalty was unconscionable. Id. These allegations and defenses, if proven, 
would be a complete defense to Arbogast's claims against it. At the very least, they are 
certainly not frivolous. 
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Because River Crossings' motion met all of the requirements of Rule 60(b), the 
district court abused its discretion in failing to set aside the default judgment. This Court 
should therefore reverse the ruling of the district court and sel aside the default judgment. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT WAS BASED ON FAULTY FINDINGS OF FACT. 
A. Standard of Review. 
A court's refusal to set aside a default judgment based on faulty findings of fact 
constitutes an abuse of discretion and cannot stand. 
As a threshold matter, a court's ruling must be "based on 
adequate findings of fact" and "on the law." 
Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75 U 9, 11 P.3d 277. This Court will reverse findings of fact 
that the marshaled evidence demonstrates are clearly erroneous. Bingham Consolidation 
Co. v. Groesbeck. 2004 UT App 434, If 14, 105 P.3d 365, 370. 
B. The District Court's Finding That There Were No Communications 
Between the Parties From June 29 to August 18 was Clearly 
Erroneous. 
In its Findings of Fact, the district court confusingly stated that, aside from a June 
29 letter from Plaintiffs counsel to Defendant's counsel, "[tjhere were not any other 
discussions between Plaintiffs counsel and Defendant's counsel between the June the 
[sic] June 29, 2006 and August 18, 2006." (R. at 117 ^ 20, 22.) In fact, River Crossings 
contacted Arbogast during this time period in an attempt to continue settlement 
negotiations. Specifically, on July 25, 2006, Mike Chernine, Managing Member of River 
Crossings, sent an e-mail to Arbogast, requesting another settlement negotiation 
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conference to discuss the ongoing dispute. (R. at 59, 102.) Arbogast never denied this.2 
Therefore, although the district court's finding is perhaps technically correct as it relates 
solely to counsel of record, by omitting any reference to the July 25 e-mail, the court's 
findings misleadingly suggest that there were no further attempts at settlement during this 
time period. The fact that there were further communications between the parties during 
this time period is critical as it pertains to River Crossings understanding that settlement 
negotiations were continuing and that Arbogast would not file for default without first 
notifying River Crossings. The district court's finding is therefore misleading, 
inaccurate, and clearly erroneous. 
C. The District Court's Finding That Arbogast "Required" River 
Crossings to File a Responsive Pleading was Clearly Erroneous. 
In its Findings of Fact, the district court stated as follows: 
That on or about June 29, 2006, Plaintiffs counsel sent a 
letter ("June 29, 2006 letter") via facsimile transmission to 
Defendant's counsel, addressed to Tisha Black-Chernine and 
to Josh Corelli, informing both of them that Plaintiff had 
rejected the oral settlement offer and was requiring 
Defendant to file an answer to the complaint within twenty 
(20) days. 
(R. at 117 J^ 20) (emphasis added). In reality, the June 29 letter merely stated as follows: 
My client has previously granted your client an extension of 
time within which to answer the complaint. However, given 
the present state of the case, I am, on behalf of my client, 
hereby requesting that your client file an Answer to the 
complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter. 
2
 Although Arbogast moved to have this evidence excluded at the hearing on River 
Crossings' Motion for Relief, River Crossings had no opportunity to brief the issue and 
the district court never ruled on the issue. (R. at 185, at 3-4). 
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(R. at 91) (emphasis added). 
In light of Mr. Utley's prior representations that he would not pursue default 
judgment without first notifying opposing counsel, the district court's use of the word 
"requiring" is an inaccurate characterization of the June 29, 2006 Letter. It suggests an 
ultimatum where none was given. When read in the context of Mr. Utley's 
representations, the letter "requesting" that a responsive pleading be filed does not 
convey a sense of urgency or a threat of default. Mr. Utley communicated a request that 
counsel file a responsive pleading, but did not "require" such action accompanied by a 
notice or threat of default. The district court's use of the word "requiring" in its finding 
is therefore misleading, inaccurate, and clearly erroneous. 
The district court's refusal to set aside the default judgment was premised in part 
on faulty findings of fact. The district court's refusal therefore constituted an abuse of 
discretion and must be reversed by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the requirements of Rule 5(a) and the express representations of opposing 
counsel, River Crossings did not receive notice from Arbogast of its initiation of default 
proceedings until default judgment had already been entered. River Crossings was 
reasonably justified in failing to defend itself based on its good faith belief that no action 
could or would be taken against it without notice. For these reasons, the district court 
abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment against River Crossings. 
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; 
DATED this '__ day of October, 2007. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
Scott M. Lilja 
Nicole M. Deforge 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this yjy day of October, 2007, I caused to be mailed, 
first-class, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT, to: 
Chad J. Utley 
Tyler T. Todd 
Farris & Utley, PC 
189 North Main Street 
P.O. Box 2408 
St. George, UT 84771-2408 
0SlA^ oU^cOtfj, 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE CTFUTAH 
ARBOGAST FAMILY TRUST, by and 
through RODNEY J. ARBOGAST as 
TRUSTEE, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RIVERCROSSINGS, LLC, a Nevada Limited 
Liability Company, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF 
FROM JUDGMENT AND ORDERS 
Civil No. 060500096 
Judge Eric A. Ludlbw 
On February 21, 2007, this matter came before the Court for hearing on the Motion for 
Relief from Judgment and Orders submitted by Defendant River Crossings, LLC. Defendant's 
Managing Member, Michael Chernine was present along with represented counsel of record, 
Jeffrey C. Wil cox, of the law firm of Gallian, Wilcox, Welker & Olson, L.C. Plaintiff, Rodney J. 
Arbogast, as Trustee of the Arbogast Family Trust, was present along with represented counsel of 
record, Chad J. Utley, of the law firm of Farris & Utley, PC. This Court, having reviewed all 
pleadings of record and considered the oral arguments of counsel, hereby FINDS and ORDERS 
as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 
1. That the Arbogast Family Trust (hereinafter "Plaintiff) provided River Crossings, LLC 
(hereinafter "Defendant") with a loan in the amount of two million four hundred fifty 
thousand dollars ($2,450,000.00) (hereinafter "loan"). 
2. That the loan was secured by a Trust Deed Note dated September 16, 2004. 
3. That pursuant to express terms of the Trust Deed Note, any remaining unpaid balance, 
along with accrued interest, was due and payable on September 16, 2005 (hereinafter 
"maturity date"). 
4. That the Trust Deed Note provided a schedule of payments as follows: The sum of 
eighteen thousand three hundred seventy-five dollars ($18,375.00) monthly, interest only, 
beginning on October 16, 2004, and a like sum of eighteen thousand three hundred 
seventy-five dollars ($18,375.00) monthly on the 16th day of each and every month 
thereafter until the 16th day of September, 2005. 
5. After the 16lh of September, 2005, the entire remaining unpaid balance, together with 
interest accrued thereon, (hereinafter "final payment") was to become immediately due 
and payable. {See copy of Trust Deed Note attached as Exhibit UA" to Defendant's 
Memorandum In Opposition to Motion). 
6. That on or about the 16th of September, 2005, when the remaining unpaid principal 
balance, together with interest accrued thereon, became due and payable, Defendant was 
unable and/or failed to tender the final payment. 
7. Defendant paid the final payment to Plaintiff on October 7, 2005, twenty-one (21) days 
later. 
2 
That the Trust Deed Note signed on September 16. 2004, expressly provided by its terms 
a penalty for late payment (hereinafter 'late payment penalty") as follows: 
A late payment penalty of six percent (6%) if any payments shall 
be assessed against the maker if said payment has not been 
received by Holder [Plaintiff] within five (5) days of the due date. 
Each payment shall be credited first to any late payments due, then 
to accrued interest due and the remainder to principal. Any such 
installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the 
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum until paid. 
(See copy of Trust Deed Note attached to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition as 
Exhibit "A".) 
That Defendant disputed and refused to pay the late payment penalty. 
That on or about October 6, 2005 and as a result of Defendant's dispute over the late 
payment penalty, Defendant authorized Southern Utah Title Company to withhold one 
hundred seventy-eight thousand five hundred thirty-nine dollars ($178,539.31) 
(hereinafter "escrowed funds") and to hold said amount in escrow pending the resolution 
of the dispute. (See copy of Escrow Instruction/Holdback Agreement attached as Exhibit 
"B" to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition.) 
That the Escrow Instruction/Holdback Agreement provided, in part, that the title company 
would disburse the funds in accordance with the parties' agreement, or if no agreement, 
then in accordance with a court order. Id. 
That Plaintiff and Defendant attempted to reach and agreement concerning the 
interpretation of the late payment penalty, but the parties were unable to come to an 
agreement. Subsequently, on January 10, 2006, Plaintiff filed its complaint which 
initiated the instant case for declaratory judgment. 
3 
That on or about December 20, 2005, Plaintiffs counsel received a letter from Josh 
Corelli, on behalf of Tisha Black-Chernine. informing Plaintiff that Defendant had 
retained the legal services of Black, Lobello & Pitegoff (See copy of Josh Corelli Letter 
attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition as "Exhibit C;" see also Affidavit of 
ChadJ.Utleyat^4). 
That Plaintiff attempted to serve Defendant. However, despite diligent efforts to locate 
and serve Defendant, Plaintiff was unable to effectuate service. Thereafter, Plaintiff 
sought and obtained an Order of Alternative Service which granted Plaintiff permission to 
serve Defendant's counsel. 
That on April 4, 2006, Plaintiff served Defendant's counsel, Tisha Black-Chernine, at the 
firm of Black, Lobello and Pitegoff 
That Plaintiffs counsel granted Defendant's Nevada counsel, Aileen E. Cohen of Black, 
Lobello & Pitegoff, two (2) separate extensions of time in which to respond to Plaintiffs 
complaint for for the purpose of engaging in settlement negotiations and/or to seek Utah 
counsel. (See copy of Aileen E. Cohen Letters attached as "Exhibit D" to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition.) 
That on June 14, 2006 the second (2nd) of the two (2) time extensions granted through 
Plaintiffs counsel to Defendant's counsel expired. (See letter from Ms. Cohen attached 
as "Exhibit D" of Plaintiff s Memorandum in Opposition; see also, 1)7 of Affidavit of 
Chad J. Utley attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition). 
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18. That sometime between June 14, 2006, and June 28. 2006, Mr. Utley had contact with 
Defendant's counsel, Tisha Black-Chernine. and also with Josh Corelli, both of the law 
firm of Black, LoBello & Sparks. (See Affidavit of Chad J. Utley). 
19. That on or about June 28, 2006, Josh Corelli offered sum certain as settlement via the 
telephone to Mr. Utley. (See Affidavit of Chad J. Utley attached to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition). 
20. That on or about June 29, 2006, Plaintiffs counsel sent a letter ("June 29, 2006 letter") 
via facsimile transmission to Defendant's counsel, addressed to Tisha Black-Chernine 
and to Josh Corelli, informing both of them that Plaintiff had rejected the oral settlement 
offer and was requiring Defendant to file an answer to the complaint within twenty (20) 
days. (See Letter from Chad J. Utley dated June 29, 2006, attached to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition as Exhibit wtE.") 
21. There were no other extensions were granted to Defendant to answer Plaintiffs complaint 
after Plaintiff, through counsel, sent the June 29, 2006 letter. 
22. There were not any other discussions between Plaintiffs counsel and Defendant's 
counsel between the June 29, 2006 and August 18, 2006. 
23. Pursuant to the June 29, 2006 letter, an answer was to be filed within twenty (20) days of 
June 29, 2006. 
24. That Plaintiffs counsel waited approximately thirty-two (32) calendar days, prior to 
Plaintiffs filing the Default Notice of Default with this Court. 
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25 That on July 31. 2006. Plaintiff filed of record in this matter a Certificate of Default due 
to Defendant's failure to answer Plaintiffs complaint which was served on April 4, 2006; 
approximately four (4) months after service of the complaint upon Defendant. 
26. That on August 11, 2006, a default judgment was entered of record in favor of Plaintiff 
against Defendant. 
27. That on August 17, 2006, Notice of Entry of Default Judgment was filed with the Court 
and was sent by Plaintiff the Defendant. 
28. That Plaintiff did not receive any communication from Defendant from the time of the 
June 28, 2006 teleconference until an August 18, 2006 telephone call from Defendant's 
counsel, Tisha Black-Chernine to Plaintiffs counsel. 
29. That pursuant to URCP Rule 5(a)(2), Defendant's counsel has not formally appeared in 
the instant action. Nevertheless, Defendant's counsel's notification and communications 
with Plaintiffs counsel constitute an appearance and there was adequate notice was given 
to Defendant, pursuant to the June 29, 2006 letter, that an answer was required to be filed 
in response to Plaintiffs complaint. 
30. That the contention that Defendant's counsel expected notice prior to the default entry is 
unfounded given the express provisions of the June 29, 2006 letter. 
31. That there was, on the part of the Defendant, a failure to exercise due diligence by failing 
to follow up or otherwise communicate with Plaintiffs counsel after receiving the June 
29, 2006 letter and by failing to file an answer after having been requested to do so after 
Plaintiff provided Defendant with written notice that the time for extensions had 
concluded and that the settlement offer had been rejected. 
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32 That the lack of due diligence resulted in Defendant's failure to respond to Plaintiffs 
complaint within the allotted time. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court has broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside the default judgment. 
Relief under Rule 60(b) is remedial in nature and as such this Court's discretion is limited and 
has to be set within the confines of existing case law. In accordance with Utah law and the Facts 
set forth above, this Court concludes that Defendant's actions and inactions in this matter do not 
rise to the level of excusable neglect, inadvertence, surprise or mistake. 
Defendant's counsel's purported reliance upon Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure is not 
reasonable and does not constitute excusable neglect. This Court relies, in part, upon the case of 
Mini Spas, Inc. V. Industrial Commission, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987) for the premise that 
excusable neglect is the exercise of due diligence by a reasonable and prudent person under 
similar circumstances. 
It would have been minimally prudent on the part of the Defendant to have taken steps 
necessary to investigate their client's claim in the State of Utah, to become familiar with Utah 
law and/or to consult a Utah counsel in order to protect Defendant's interest, rather than rely 
upon the belief that Utah's Rules of Civil Procedures were identical to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure enacted by the State of Nevada. Defendant has therefore failed to demonstrate that 
Defendant used sufficient due diligence in trying to respond to Plaintiffs complaint or to address 
Plaintiffs June 29, 2006 letter. Defendant simply was not prevented from either answering the 
7 
complaint or from responding to the June 29. 2006 letter by circumstances over which Defendant 
did not have any control. (See, e.g., Black's Title, Inc , v. State Ins. Dep't, 991 P.2d 607 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1999) andAirkemJntermounlain, lnc v Parker, 513 P.2d 429 (Utah 1973)). 
Defendant has argued that the discharge of Defendant's counsel Aileen Cohen resulted in 
ensuing confusion that lead to excusable neglect. However, it the ultimate discussions 
surrounding the settlement offer and the June 29, 2006 letter were not addressed to Ms. Cohen, 
the departing attorney, but to Ms. Tisha Black-Chernine and Mr. Josh Correlli, the individuals 
with whom Plaintiffs counsel had been discussing the most recent settlement offer. Based upon 
the foregoing facts, Defendant's excuses for its failure to answer Plaintiffs complaint do not 
constitute excusable neglect, inadvertent surprise or mistake on behalf of Defendant or that 
Defendant's counsel's actions and inactions rise to the level under which would allow relief to be 
granted under URCP 60(b). 
The facts, allegations and circumstances argued by the Defendant to set aside the 
judgment are properly categorized under URCP 60(b)(1), involving "mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect," and not under URCP 60(b)(6). In Black's Title, Inc., 991 P.2d at 
612, the Utah Appellate Court found that "subsection (6) may not be employed for relief when 
the grounds asserted are encompassed within subsection (1)." The allegations and facts argued 
by Defendant are encompassed within subsection 1 of URCP 60(b) and are, therefore, not 
considered under subsection (6). 
The Court concludes that Plaintiff rightfully could interpret Defendant's inaction in the 
instant matter to be Defendant's acquiescence to the allegations contained in Plaintiffs 
complaint. Defendant was given adequate notice to file an answer, but failed to do so and also 
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failed to contact Plaintiffs counsel to either seek an additional extension or for clarification of 
the June 29, 2006 letter. Therefore, based upon the foregoing facts, Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside the Default Judgment should be denied. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, after consideration of the arguments of the parties, the pleadings filed by 
the parties and the documents on file with the Court, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. That Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment is hereby denied; and, 
2. The Default Judgment entered of record in this matter on August 11, 2006 remains in full 
force and effect. 
DATED this | V j / day of April, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Eric A. Ludlow 
District Court Judge 
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